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Abstract: Historically, academia has paid much attention to environmental Kuznets curve (EKC)
associated hypotheses, and the EKC per se has triggered conflicting reactions since first posited. Yet,
all controversies seem not to have any base framework to address further pollution-related strategies.
Built upon an extensive critical review of the extant EKC literature, this paper attempts to address the
gap by introducing the theory of wicked problems that can be used to reframe the extant EKC research.
Integrating and synthesizing the theories and empirical findings of the extant EKC literature, this
paper develops a conceptual framework (a research agenda), and suggests that, given humans’ bound
rationality and societal uncertainties, the EKC pattern may not be valid for the situations of more
wicked pollution. Mainly focusing on this type of pollution, the paper contributes to the EKC study
in proposing a set of causal relationships built upon the attitudes of societal sectors. The paper points
to the necessity of distinguishing the less wicked pollution situations from the more wicked ones that
require different practical and academic strategies to deal with. The former can be addressed along
with economic growth, and the latter requires proactive attitudes, proactive leadership, and strong
organization of societal sectors. In doing so, we hope to advance the conversation surrounding EKC
studies and the abatement practice adaption. Contributions of this study and future research avenues
for empirical verifications of the theory are then discussed.
Keywords: environmental Kuznets curve; wicked problems; societal sector; collaboration; triggering
event
1. Introduction
Before the advent of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), the relationship between economic
growth and environmental protection attracted considerable attention dating back to the 1960s. Having
fought hard with the main societal problem, namely poverty, the national governments of most
developing and underdeveloped countries believed that economic growth provided sustainable
resources and technology to tackle environmental problems. Meanwhile, environmental activists
and global institutes have kept warning that fast economic growth produces even more industrial
and domestic waste, and the accumulation of such waste leads to environmental deterioration and
eventually unaffordable prices for the economy and fatal threats to the survival of mankind.
In the 1980s, attention turned to so-called ‘sustainable development’, which was originally
advocated at the United Nations (UN) conference, and referred to the national welfare notion to meet
the needs of the present generation without compromising the needs of future generations. Among the
rapidly expanding theoretical and empirical literature, EKC associated hypotheses have gained heated
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interest in academia. Panayotou (1993) finds a strong link between pollution emissions and economic
growth in an inverted-U curve [1]. This was the very first report to introduce the term EKC due to
its resemblance to the Kuznets hypothesis of income inequalities, showing that, initially, pollution
increases in parallel to income growth, then the line goes down after climbing over a turning point
(Figure 1). To elaborate, the economy initially starts from the point of “too poor to be green” [2], then
the economy grows at the cost of the environment because “certain environmental problems are linked
with the deficiency of economic development”[3], but in the end economic growth sweeps away the
previous pollution, resulting in the situation of “grow up first, clean up later”[4].
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From the perspective of economic activities, s r l i fl ti l odels have b en developed
for further justification and l ration. r l , the industry-upgrading model proposes the
transformation mode of economic development from the polluting industrial economy to the clean
service conomy [1,5]. r Solo model claims the process of emission reduction arising
from exogenous technology progress, leading to a gr ater usage efficiency i energy and materials
that successively reduces the impositions on the t r l r r and environment [1]. Further, the
displacement model introduces a theory that higher environmental standards in developed areas
push or outsource dirty industries to underdev loped areas—the point that has been proposed in the
pollution haven hypothesis [6].
However, EKC associated hypothes raise the set of multi-facet d questions with the progress
of res arch, especially when the cause of pollution extends to the social system and national context.
For instance, Kaika nd Zervas (2011) find that the EKC places too much emphasi on the production,
arguing that the improvement of technol gical structure would be offset when the final consumption
holds the pollution intensive [7], especially under the constant growth of the volume of urban wastes
generated [8]. Further, several other studies [9,10] point out that most empirical studies have assessed
the turni g point of the EKC based on the average income level of the countries, assuming that the
world income is normally distributed—yet the world distribution is indeed highly skewed [11,12], thus
it is rather unrealistic to turn to the average income in order to estimate the turning point of the EKC.
Furthermore, it has been found that s cially deprived areas are exposed to even m re environmental
degradation [13]. Grimes a d Roberts (1997) state that the EKC is valid only for those developed
countries with a colonial history, geopolitical powers, and trade superiority [14], therefore the pattern
may not be as valid to the less developed worl of today [15], implying that the EKC pattern may not
be repeatable for develo ing countries.
As research proceeds, scholars may find it not so optimistic that, as EKC believes, people can deal
with pollution well when the economy gr ws further. Sinha (2010) introduces the case of the USA
where more than one million polluted properties are still present in the soil—even after several billion
dollars have been invested to deal with it. Sin a therefore warns that some p llutants are just too
complicated and costly to remedy, probably impossible to reverse [16]. Thus, the “grow now, clean up
later” strategy has been developed and implemented on a very limited knowledge base of toxicological
risks and environmental degrading [17]. Meanwhile, it may only be applicable to local pollutants like
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urban wastes and water pollution. When it comes to pollution with transboundary impacts, especially
global pollutants such as CO2, no country has sufficient incentive to regulate these emissions [18,19].
Furthermore, the methodology and econometric techniques of the extant EKC research have been
deeply questioned due to the empirical results that are so controversial for research assumptions
and parametric specifications. It is clear that most environmental issues involve multiple interacting
systems, replete with not only rational choices but social and institutional uncertainties. One case
is the difficulty of action in addressing greenhouse gas emission. In the case, while some nations,
organizations, and company frontrunners have taken practical actions in reducing CO2 emission,
others feel reluctant to assume the environmental responsibilities and, controversially, think about the
relationship between human activities and global climate change not from a science mind but from the
perspective of political intentions [20]. The coordinative complexity and different understanding of
aims and means among many decision-makers contribute to the huge gap typically arising between
ambitious promises and practical performance in grand multi-level programs. Consequently, in the
exploration of environmental issues, such problems have been widely recognized from the perspective
of the wicked problems theory. Methodologically, the wicked problems cannot be resolved through
the traditional analysis of vast amounts of data or conventional statistical analyses [21].
To advance EKC research, we provide a first step towards initiating, organizing, and developing
a productive exchange between research on the EKC and wicked problems. From the perspective
of wicked problems, this paper seeks to contribute to the literature as it advances a conceptual base
framework to help dynamically describe and understand potential pollution–growth relationships and
the conditions. The paper is structured as follows. First, the wicked problems theory is introduced to
reframe the extant EKC into an attitudinal mindset towards pollution. Through tracing the wickedness
sources from the lens of stakeholders’ mindsets, the paper proceeds to look at the situation of the more
wicked pollution, illustrating that the EKC pattern is not valid for the special situation. Through an
extensive critical literature, we propose a set of relationships between such pollution and economic
growth, and our viewpoints of critical thinking about the attitudinal transitions of societal actors in
dealing with such pollution. Further, we put forward possible effective ways to attain both economic
and environmental goals. The contributions of this study and future research avenues for empirical
verifications of the theory are also discussed.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Reframing the Extant EKC into an Attitudinal Mind-set towards Pollution
The lens of wicked problems differs from the technical rationality of econometric techniques
in many ways. The greatest difference, which makes the perspective so special, lies in that wicked
problems are interpreted as a framework of competing values rather than viewing the problems as
knowledge gaps [22]. From this perspective, dealing with the associated problems involves a series of
collective actions that require attention to multiple factors of the economic- environmental system [23].
As such, the application of econometric techniques in the EKC test is in question because the empirical
results of these studies are very sensitive to the assumptions, specifications, and functional forms,
very little attention has been paid to omit variable bias and to model adequacy [18,24]. The wicked
problems methodologically cannot be resolved through the traditional analysis of vast amounts of
data or conventional statistical analyses. Methodologically, the wicked problems cannot be resolved
through the traditional analysis of vast amounts of data or conventional statistical analyses [21].
The more societal and the less technical a challenge is, the greater its potential to become wicked.
Both starting as an urban planning scientist, Horst Rittel and Malvin Webber found that most societal
issues cannot be solved by planning. “As we seek to improve the effectiveness of actions in pursuit of
valued outcomes, as system boundaries get stretched, and as we become more sophisticated about the
complex working of open societal systems, it becomes ever more difficult to make the planning idea
operational” [25].
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In 1973, Rittel and Webber co-published a paper which characterizes the societal-focus problems
as wicked problems [25]. Following the seminal work, many others have argued that wicked
problems should not be treated as a simple or “tame” problem, which is solvable since it can be
unambiguously defined, and the approaches and principles for desired outcomes are known and
rather transparent [26,27]. Neither can wicked problems be treated as complex problems which the
solution to, and the cause–effect relations of, are unclear, but can be known over time after other
ways of thinking. They go beyond being too complex to address, even resist the analytical definition
because each problem appears to be a symptom of other problems and the cause-effect relations of
and solutions to them are largely unclear and unstable. Furthermore, since there is no analytical way
to structure, understand, and define the problem, it is impossible to know when it can be solved
satisfactorily, at best it is only resolved over and over again [25]. Thus, wicked problems are often
described as “social messes” [28] that defy resolution due to enormous interdependencies, uncertainties,
and even circularities [26]. Besides the environmental issues, most social problems can be viewed
as wicked problems, including poverty, terrorism, discrimination, healthcare and natural source
management—they are often intertwined, and one can be the cause of the others.
Moreover, pollution has been fairly described as a “super wicked problem” due to its exacerbating
nature and the lack of governance mechanisms [29,30]. On the one hand, its aggravating nature
illustrates that time is surely not costless—the longer it takes to address, the harder it will be to do.
As pollutants increase, exponentially larger and greater technological advances should be achieved to
bring pollutant concentrations down to the desired level. The efforts invested in technological advances
are made to make up for the lost time, so as to make it much harder to accomplish the necessary
technological innovation. On the other hand, to most of the transboundary pollution, there are no
existing institutional frameworks for developing, implementing, and maintaining the laws necessary
to address the issues of tremendous spatial and temporal scope. Especially for cases of global pollution
such as greenhouse gas emissions, there are no global lawmaking institutions with jurisdictional and
legal authorities to address the problem [31]. Thus, the “super wicked” notion speaks to the wicked
nature of pollution, in that there is no authority in charge, but it surely needs urgent unified actions.
However, not all wicked problems are equally intractable, and not all pollution problems are
equally wicked either. Pollution of lower wickedness is relatively easy to deal with, which can be
categorized as tame or complex problems, can be addressed by, such as, the breakthrough of advanced
technology, or the establishment and effective enforcement of laws in regulating stakeholders’ behaviors.
The EKC transition is found very true for the pollutants that have local and regional dimensions,
not so wicked, which can be reduced at the relatively low cost of economic growth [32]. When the
wickedness goes up to a higher level however, the environment–economy trajectory could go beyond
the inverted U speculated in the EKC hypotheses. The more wicked the nature is, the more uncertain
the relationships will be.
To depict the possible relationships, we need understand where the wickedness comes from and
how the sources determine the pollution emissions. Next, we trace the wickedness sources from
rational accounts and social accounts, illustrating that more wicked pollution prevents stakeholders
from making rational decisions for bounded rationality, and at the same time, every stakeholder needs
to continually optimize their response to the actions of others.
2.2. Source of Pollution Wickedness from the Lens of Stakeholders’ Mind-sets
2.2.1. Pollution Wickedness of Rational Accounts
According to the theory of bounded rationality, further light can be shed on the wickedness source
by three sources of ambiguity—the primary one is knowledge ambiguity. The knowledge base of
pollution requires a considerable amount of basic data and sophisticated information, while relevant
information is always incomplete, and part of them can be hidden, disguised or intangible. This
ambiguity is partly related to the limited technology today, leading to the sole focus of the EKC studies
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on selected air and water pollutants, without taking into account toxic and carcinogenic compounds,
complicated pollutants in soil and underground water, biodiversity, and desertification, among others.
The source of ambiguity is also related to the stakeholders’ knowledge-framing, in which too much
or too little attention is paid on the relevant information. The attitudes towards pollution may be
determined by the process of evidence creation, the selection of evidence, and the interpretation of
evidence. The human knowledge frame tends to be pessimistic [33], and human beings are often
inclined to focus on dangers, and to be concerned more about what needs to be done now, and less
about what can be done later. In either case, an environmental disaster may receive more attention than
the climate warming. Additionally, ambiguity can also exist in the political sense as illustrated above.
Since the pollution problem is a consequence of population and human activities, the disagreement
between stakeholders surrounding pollution often reflects the different emphases they place on various
causal factors in different contexts on account of the interests vested therein, thus some information
and evidence can be “made” or selected or covered intentionally. From above, we can see there is a big
gap can be detected between the “truth”of pollution and stakeholders’ perceptions about pollution.
Next, derived from the first is predictive ambiguity. One cannot build predictions on the lack of
proper understanding of a phenomenon, nor can one extrapolate development under highly uncertain
and unstable conditions. In the technological sector, people even cannot predict it is good news or
bad because a breakthrough of technological innovation can bring uncertain risks on human and the
environment. For instance, the introduction of genetic technology in food industry. In the political
sector, policies in attempt to reducing pollution are not excluded from “unintended consequences”.
The more urgent a pollution problem is, the higher the likelihood that actions will be taken without
thorough planning and design. Even under a careful design, the effects of policies may be based on
many assumptions. However, such generative and dynamic complexities of pollution are shaped by,
and further fed into, societal, communicative, and structural complexity dimensions in an unpredictable
way. Unanticipated and unintended consequences of purposeful actions can be positive, negative,
or “perverse” [34]. Here is a demonstrative case. In China, the restriction of odd or even licensed vehicles
in smog weathers unintentionally encouraged the rise of private cars in Chinese families. In the global
sector, since there are no global lawmaking institutions with jurisdictional legal authorities, policies are
more oriented towards local interests. However, it needs to point out that some of these unanticipated
consequences may well be deleterious, others might create unforeseen opportunity to stakeholders.
Further derived from the above is intervention ambiguity. Pollution issues are more than their
technical complexities, and the societal complexity dimension determines the effectiveness of the
chosen interventions. The divergence of interests, values, and power bases reflects the fragmenting
motions within the system, and hence a coordinated intervention would be difficult to attain. When
pollution becomes wicked, the structural and communicative complexities determine that no shared
visions on the exact nature, scope and scale of the problem, nor a definitive, stable or well-defined
solution can be held. Under such circumstances, problem-solving is often impossible due to the
pragmatic reasons where deadlines are met or dictated by resource constraints rather than as the result
of “correct” solutions identified. To pursue “solving” or “fixing” approaches may lead policymakers to
act on unwarranted, unsafe assumptions and create unrealistic expectations. Therefore, addressing
pollution usually needs a range of coordinated and interrelated responses, involving trade-offs of
conflicting goals. Moreover, small changes of different regions can unfold largely unforeseeable
differentia of system dynamics, leaving “traces” and creating path dependencies with “no right to be
wrong”, and no ultimately correct answers. The more wicked the problem is, the more likely a single
intervention leads to the irreversible consequences. In this sense, intervention ambiguity means that
effective interventions should be customized for different regions.
2.2.2. Pollution Wickedness of Social Accounts
Due to its ingrained boundary-spanning nature, more wicked pollution tends to generate conflicts
of interests among multiple stakeholders when they attempt to frame and analyze the problems
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4747 6 of 17
according to their own perceptions, needs and interests. These conflicts themselves often create
misleading frames that complicate matters even more when pollution stakeholders think of pollution
issues in logical or illogical, and/or multi-valued thinking ways [28,35], from different contexts
of state, market, civil society, and the leadership of organization. A typical example is that, the
federal government of America has presented a big recession in the greenhouse problem, tending
to deregulation, whereas some stakeholders in developing countries are more likely to view such
pollution abasement as an important sustainable behavior [36].
How can the actions of stakeholders be inconsistent? We illustrate the details with the help
of the societal triangle model. There are three important societal stakeholders or—in institutional
terms—societal sectors surrounding and defining the problems, namely governments, firms, and civil
society. The further pollution is beyond the grasp of the primary responsibility and core capabilities
of each sector, the more wicked it becomes to come to effective solution-oriented approaches. The
most-wicked problems are positioned in the societal centre, where the institutional void and the trust
gap is the biggest. (Figure 2)
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1+1+1 Sectoral failure. Being exposed to the pollution, the sectors fails in their capability to produce
sufficient goods and values, even when this is their primary responsibility. The market failure exists in the
case that firms do not supply clean goods that people want or can afford—governance failure exists in the
case that governments are incompetent with respect to pollution supervision and policy implementation,
and civil failure exists in the case that communities do not lead environment-friendly lives.
2+2+2 Irresponsibility for handling negative externalities. When a sector produces a negative
effect on society, costs to the system increase as a result. Theoretically, it is the trouble maker’s
responsibility to take care of the issue. But the fact is contrary. Take the industrial pollution as an
example, if a company realizes that his or her share of the cost of the wastes they discharge into the
environment is less than the cost for purifying the wastes, the company will be locked into a mindset
of “fouling your nest”, and tend to shrug off the environmental cost. Only when other sectors assign
responsibility to them will the company be reactive to take it up. This could happen if governments
regulate against pollution, or citizens and societal organizations protest against it.
3+3+3 Insufficiency of positive externalities. Some problems can be addressed by individual
sectors, but it may run the risk of being underprovided if the problems are left to the initiating sector.
This relates to the so called “merit goods”, suggesting the commodity in which the society or an
individual should have on the basis needs, rather than on his or her ability and willingness to pay.
Furthermore, these active actions trying to fill in the void may run the risk of taking away the incentive
for other sectors to contribute as well.
4+4+4 Systematical challenges. The so-called “common pool” problems are no-one’s primary
responsibility yet they affect everyone in the longer run. They are also referred to as “tragedy of
the commons” and can be considered the most wicked in the social account. One instance is the
increasingly serious plastic pollution today makes trouble to more and more coast countries though
not all of them are the troublemakers. The existing governance system cannot address such global
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environmental problems that have gone far beyond the boundaries of countries, industry sectors,
consumers’ habits, and human generations. Such systematical problems are also called“collective
action” problems, as they require the joint collective actions of all societal sectors to be involved.
The variety of the societal sources of wickedness indicates that it may be difficult—not
impossible—for a societal sector to take up responsibilities for the related issues that lie beyond
his/her primary roles and capacities, even if the sector has long-termed interest in doing so.
A well-functioning society should act as a “balanced” one, in which each societal sector plays
constructive and complementary roles. The better each sector functions to be balanced, the more
promising it will be in addressing the more wicked pollution situation.
2.3. Proposing Relationships between Wicked Pollution and Economic Growth
From above, we can see that each societal sector adds a different, complementary approach and
logic to more wicked pollution, because the primary responsibility, main competencies, and main
duties of each sector differ markedly from each other. To keep the problem-based societal ecosystem
in a desirable shape, it is important that the opportunities should not mainly accrue to the “happy
few” who are in the position to reap fruits, and it is also vital that opportunities do not mirror overly
optimistic or superficial claims of the extent to which they are actually contributing to the resolution
of the problem. So, if any societal sector actually takes an inactive attitude—as if to say “I don’t
have a personal desire, nor do I feel the social pressure to be engaged in pollution abasement”—the
ecosystem will get corroded in the end, and inevitably a social mess will occur.
Proposition 1. Wicked pollution will increase during the economic growth if any societal sector holds the
inactive attitude, as shown in the first phase of the EKC.
When increasingly serious situations trigger some outbreak of salient events, the responsive
transition will be evoked, the situation can turn to “I will be engaged in pollution abasement, when I am
reminded or called out by others, so that I can prevent penalties or negative opinions of others”. The
reaction of the government is strengthening supervision, and the reactive business leads to corporate
technology improvement to minimize the harm [38]. However, the transition at most acts as a placebo
because all the reactions also provide the evasions of their further action to fulfill primary responsibility.
For example, the CEO of Exxon Mobil Corp., Rex Tillerson has claimed that there is no viable pathway
for technology today to achieve the tipping point of the carbon dioxide level that is no harm to
economies and well-being around the world [39].
So, any reaction can be seen as a window-dressing promise, refusing radical change to let in the
intrinsic motivation. The same story could happen to other stakeholders, who are unable to skip the
gaps to become active. In the case that pollution emissions cannot really be held under control, rising
along with economic growth in the end, though temporary decline may occur due to technological
progress, strengthening supervision or some other positive effects in the process.
Proposition 2. The pollution growth curve presents a wavy line with an upward tendency when all the societal
sectors take the reactive attitude—the deformation line of the first phase of EKC. (Figure 3, line 1)
When one societal sector actively does too much beyond his/her “territory”, but others remain
reactive, it will lead to poor efficiency, and encourage others to reap the benefits as well. This may not
be good news for sustainability. For example, if a corporate frontrunner does too much philanthropy in
an environmental movement, some non-profit activities will be obviously deviated from its fiduciary
duty. This is rather negative to its business and the economic sector. Similarly, if a government with
over-active logic uses too many subsidies to encourage companies or non-profit organizations to take
abatement measures, as a result, they will all suffer from a “subsidy addiction” which may negatively
affect their capacity to stand on their own feet. In this situation, the entire economy would boom
first, then bust in the end. For instance, the sales of China’s plug-in electric vehicles, benefiting from
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the massive central and local government subsidies, surged 343% in 2015 [40]. However, the China
New Energy Vehicle Report (2017) reflects that the blind subsidies did not lead to a high amount of
technology in the new energy vehicle sector, and statistics show that sales plunged after the reduction
of subsidy at the end of 2018 [41]. In this regard, Dr. Winegarden states “If [the] government wants to
encourage an electric car future, it should embrace the free market and remove the barriers to cheap
and efficient car manufacturing that drive up costs too high for most drivers” [42].
Proposition 3. When one societal sector holds the over-active attitude (far beyond its fiduciary duties) but
others remain reactive, the pollution-growth curve will go downwards, but with an economic decline, indicating
that environmental improvement occurs at the expense of economic growth (Figure 3, Line 2)
It is unhealthy for an ecosystem when one societal sector is excessively active in address wicked
pollution, it is also the same when two sectors are active to address pollution while the third remains
reactive, because they would take over the fiduciary responsibilities of the rest. The effect is also
known as “crowding out”. The remaining sectors remain reactive because they want to avoid high
costs and risk in the context of insufficient trust, or they are ready to be the free-riders to reap more
from the ecosystem. For instance, when communities or governments clean up the waste produced by
firms, they provide a perverse incentive for firms not to take the responsibility themselves. Anyway,
it cannot be well addressed in such a situation, though there may be some temporary declines due to
those active behaviors, showing an upward trend of wave.
Proposition 4. When two societal sectors hold active attitudes towards more wicked pollution but the rest
remain reactive, the pollution growth curve will present a wavy line with an upward tendency. (Figure 3, line 3)
More wicked pollution requires the participation of all societal sectors at the same time, who
however may not feel a responsibility, and may primarily see the risks of getting involved. Under
this circumstance, societal attitudes towards pollution become resultant of rational choice for self-
interests and societal uncertainty due to the lack of trust among societal sectors, often leading to the
inconsistencies between the intention and the implementation, and the extreme difficulty in prioritizing
as taking all trade-offs are taken into account. However, once pollution crises break out, the necessity
of an immediate response is obvious, which is also called the situation of “inescapable wickedity” [43].
Only when all societal sectors hold the active attitude—such as to say that “I am motivated to be
engaged in the abatement of pollution because it is part of my perceived identity and strongly held
beliefs (I try to); I am also motivated to engage in sustainable activities on a regular basis (I really want
to)”—can the wicked pollution get under control.
Proposition 5. The pollution growth curve will no longer go up only when all societal sectors hold the active
attitudes, realizing that pollution abasement is their own responsibilities.
The resulting voids and transitional frictions not only generate wicked problems, from a different
angle, the wickedness can be explored and leveraged as a means to drive breakthrough, and the
development of new approaches to societal challenges, or “wicked opportunities” [44]. Diverse actors
in the ecosystem can create new value through implementing productive and sophisticated models of
collaboration [45]. The practical relevance of the idea of “collaborative advantage” [46] critically relies
on appropriate cross-sector collaboration, embracing systemic goals and incremental and adaptive
change, leaving no one out. A proactive attitude is highly demanded, such as to say that “I am engaged
in pollution abatement as much as possible and encourage others to do the same in order to address
the root cause of the issue”. However, cross-sector collaborations with transformational power are not
formed overnight because the ecosystem includes both collaboration and competition, and further,
requires insightful and strategic considerations which only can be achieved with many trial-and-error
practices. Thus, “wicked opportunity” comes with “collaborative complexity” [47].
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Proposition 6. Pollution will decrease with the economic growth when all societal sectors hold the proactive
attitudes to take collective actions. Different from the second phase of EKC, however, the curve will present
a wavy line with a downward tendency. (Figure 3, line 4)
Under the right, powerful leadership, the wicked problems can be converted into opportunities
more effectively. Since wicked problems are ambiguous, indeterminate, and boundary-less, and since
enhancing ecosystem resilience calls for greater diversity and complexity, the heroic leadership is less
likely to succeed than the open, inquiry-based, and collaborative style leadership that is capable to
engage multiple stakeholders [48–50]. Different from the traditional kind of leadership that turns to
"hard power" for command and authority with a focus on providing solutions, new leaders dealing
with more wicked problems need to combine traditional "hard power" with "soft power", emphasizing
the design and implementation of cooperative processes [48,51]. These leaders should be armed with
the following characteristics: they should be able to think systematically, beyond the limitations of the
organization or field, to form a positive common vision; be good at dealing with contradictions and
conflicts; have a sense of social responsibility, and maintain trustworthy relationships in the process of
cooperation [50]. A proactive organization needs proactive leadership to address wicked problems
(see Table 1).
Table 1. The key dimensions of the leadership attitudes towards more wicked pollution.
Key Dimensions Four Types of Leadership








profitable? Do less harm Do more good Do better work











approaches Transactional Competitive Heroic Collaborative
Proposition 7. Proactive leadership is called for to encourage people and organizations to work together on
more wicked pollution and ensure its decline along with economic growth.
To address pollution, local efforts cannot be overlooked in the direction of sustainability. As fewer
developed regions may face lower costs to address regional pollution due to the lower environmental
impact at a lower level of development, Munasinghe (1995) proposes to develop an optimal growth
path or a sustainable development “tunnel” through the EKC [52]. A similar path has been proposed
to address this phenomena in China [53] and is probably underway in the ecological demonstration
areas of China, which are often located far from the rich areas with small bodies of population, low
income, and an abundance of natural resources. These regions could have very limited social resources
to deal with their environmental issues, but these would not prevent them from obtaining effective
environmental institutions and policies [54].
Since the Eco-Demonstration Construction Program was established in 1995, these communities
have adopted sustainability approaches, where income growth and environmental protection are
both the most important requirements. Very strict criteria, including more than 100 points, have been
carried out to achieve sustainability, including ecological agriculture, soil and water conservation,
the integrated use of crop residue and environmental education [55], promoting green economy
like organic agriculture, tourism, and service industry. Furthermore, the independent evaluation
mechanisms and the hotline for public supervision have been introduced to ensure the effective use of
the special financial allocations. The eco-demonstration communities—most of which have a per capita
income of less than one dollar per day (which is defined as extreme poverty by the World Bank)—have
achieved both economic and ecological improvement, resulting in sustainable poverty alleviation.
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The environmental improvement can be considered to be the result of effective organizing of societal
actors rather than income growth [56]. Thus, it is possible to skip the first phase of the EKC and go
straight to the second phase, and sustainability can be achieved in the early stages of economic growth.
Proposition 8. Though the strong organization of societal actors, environmental and economic goals can both
be achieved when the economy is at a lower level (Figure 3, Line 5).
The environment is an inclusive term encompassing both natural and human systems. The latter
refers to the interconnected aggregation of social governance systems [57]. In the context of China’s
centralized system, the governmental attitude plays an essential role in fighting for sustainability.
A proactive governments can be a good organizer of multi-sector collaborations at the center of
power of regional or national resources allocation. After all, sustainable development is at least as
heterogeneous and complex as the diversity of human societies and natural ecosystems around the
world [58], requiring an open, dynamic, and evolving mindset to fit in different situations through
the cooperation and efforts of all societal sectors. Among them, Sagoff (1994) believes that moral
and cultural values are central to both human experience and environmental policy [59]. Anyhow,
we believe that the formation of a proactive attitude and mindset is not directly connected with
economic growth.
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Figure 3. Possible relationships between more wicked pollution and economic growth.
As the proactive attitudes of societal sectors are needed to achieve the sustainability of interest,
how will the proactive attitudes be achieved? Further, how will the attitudinal transitions be achieved?
Next, against the societal background, we examine the formation process of proactive attitudes and the
achievement roadmap of the attitudinal transitions.
2.4. Attitudes of Societal Actors towards the More Wicked Pollution
According to the EKC scenario, people’s attitudes towards pollution change from the negative
to positive, and their behaviors from the passive to active with economic growth [60]. It is our
contention that the types of stakeholder attitudes towards more icked pollution are determined by
their motivations for sustainability from basic desires or from social norms.
Societal responsiveness can be intrinsic or extrinsic. The ore people know what they want, the
more they are able to frame strategies on the basis of intrinsic motives. Under this condition, people
are often motivated by “I want . . . . . . ”. If people do not know what they want or are primarily
motivated by what they “don’t want”, extrinsic motivations prevail and social nor s (must) take
over. Social norms can be influenced by the culture of a country, but they are ultimately determined
by the occupational group that people belong to. A very important argument in ethical reasoning
is, for instance, to not do any harm, or to not do anything wrong, which can be regarded as the
“negative duty”. “I must” is the regular term used to assume liability. However, in terms of motivation,
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it becomes clear that not doing harm could be important to establish basic social principles, but it does
not provide any guidance in the way of “doing more good” for society, which can drive the operation
of the whole social system more actively. The “I can” approach declares that people are willing to take
social responsibility beyond fiduciary duty.
People’s basic desire motivations are linked to social or group norms. If the group does not
have significant influence, intrinsic motivations prevail. The attitude would be “I don’t want” or
“I want”. Extrinsic motivations are linked to what people believe they “must do” or “can” then they can
achieve. We illustrate the attitude model in Figure 4, which can further define the societal complexity
of pollution.
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The intrinsic motivation is a fundamentally introverted attitude based on the human
utilitarian-oriented motive. When a societal actor find he or she is far away from the pollution,
or it does not help his/her fiduciary duty or has no foreseeable interests to make pollution abasement,
the actor will leave the majority of the responsibilities with other stakeholders, and, accordingly,
takes an inactive attitude for the pollution. However when the actor learns, for instance, from the
shocked reports and troubling pollution-generated results, that the situation is deteriorating, and
beginning to threat his/her regular life and working places, the attitudinal transition will lead to two
possible outcomes, forming the activation route or the responsive route (Figure 5). In the former
case, the actor finds it is necessary to take responsibility with a more moral and strategic attitude,
regardless of society’s response, and the actor is intrinsically motivated to move forward and becomes
a front-runner. In the latter case, the actor tends to take necessary actions according to the response of
other pollution-related stakeholders when the actor is faced with serious life-threatening problems.
The extrinsic otivations are linked to hat people ant and hat they can achieve. If people
ainly do things that they have to do, they ill beco e reactive and extrinsically otivated. There
is an argu ent to interpret the trade-off: people and organizations facing sustainability issues does
not necessarily ake oral choice, and, and hen they ake the choice, it is not necessarily ith
strong illingness. They just do not have the ability to ake the necessary changes due to the lack of
infor ation and resources. Interestingly enough, once the problem is addressed, the reactive actor will
be active and eager to inform his/her closely related stakeholders of what he/she has done for good
reputation. Once the limited information and resources benefit from an effective breakthrough, people
and organizations could become intrinsic to address pollution, that is, they will find they are “capable”
of doing more good. This change is called the capabilities route (Figure 5).
hen societal sectors realize that the pollution should be addressed through cooperation and
coordination of all stakeholders, they beco e to be a proactive actor, ill take action proactively, and
initiate strategic dialogues ith all related stakeholders. ccordingly, the great difference bet een
activeness and proactiveness is whether a set of strategic dialogues and serious cooperation are involved
within stakeholders [62], which will combine the intrinsic activeness and the extrinsic reactiveness to
other stakeholders’ decisions of the alliance. The change is defined as the collaborative route (Figure 5).
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It can be promising if, among all stakeholders, the consensus can be aroused and the strategic alliance
can be formed to proactively address pollution before the ecosystem collapses.
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Since attitudes r ly on the interaction of intrinsic trinsic motivations, any change of the
interaction can arouse attitudinal transition. Certain triggering events can bring people out of their
established routines as automatic cognitive processing occurs [63]. They can also act on the change
of an original social norm beyond the intrinsic logic of societal actors, but the routes of attitudinal
transitions are different accordingly. The triggering event is characterized as a complex of three
interacting components: high strength (its novelty, disruption, and criticality), broad space (the effects
can spread through the whole organization or society), and the long-span time (when the event occurs,
it remains impactful for a long period of tim ) [64]. Moreover, as illustrated above, the “effective”
event should focus more on danger, looking at wha needs to be done now than wha can be done
in the future due to knowledge framing towards the wicked problems. Eventually, the collaborative
route of attitudinal transition should be achieved to form collective actions among societal sectors.
3. Results and Discussions
In this paper, through an extensive literature review, we show that the extant EKC pattern is only
valid for the pollution of a less wicked nature, since such pollution can be dealt with by technical
progress and rational actions during the period of economic growth, whereas the more wicked pollution
is full of ambiguities and societal uncertainties. Based on the theoretical and empirical literature review,
we propose a set of propositions on t e relationships with the economic gr wth, showi g p tential
traject ries which can be very different from the conventional recommendations of the EKC.
In particular, our Proposition 6 claims that involv ietal sector should hold the proactive
attitudes to address such pollution through the cross-sector collaboration. The key missions cannot
be achieved without the collaborative attitudinal transition, in which the triggering events related
to pollution could promote attitudinal transitions. Both Propositions 7 and 8 indicate that proactive
leadership and the strong organization of societal actors can ensure the effective collaboration, which
could be achieved even at a lower level of the economic growth.
3.1. Contributions to EKC Study
This study makes contributions in developing a conceptual base framework to understand the
relationships between more wicked pollution and economic growth, wh ch sho ld blend the rational
accounts of optimal d cision-making with th social acc unts of conformity pressure. Societal actors
are assumed to be self-interested, norm-free, and opportunistic maximizers of short-term interest,
who typically neglect the long-term interests of the collectivity [65], which is not valid for more
wicked pollution.
Sustainability 2019, 11, 4747 13 of 17
On the one hand, such pollution is full of ambiguities, which greatly prevent people from
getting optimal solution. One the other hand, the social accounts emphasize that commons are not
predetermined but socially constructed phenomena, in which social norms motivate actors’ behaviors
instead of individualized rationality [66]. Collective awareness of the complicity in creating a commons
problem heightens actors’ collective identification with the problem and allows for practices of
collaborative engagement to remedy the problems [67,68]. Based on the notion, we argue that actors’
attitudes towards more wicked pollution is the result of social norms—a link between basic desire and
social responsiveness. The attitude classification of this study can illustrate the evolutionary process
that wicked problems emerge from the individual rationality, become wicked under social pressure,
and finally can transform into wicked opportunities, when well addressed by collective mitigation
measures based on social collaborations and efforts.
The prior EKC literature assumes a homogeneous attitude of stakeholders to address the pollution
problems from the negative to positive as the particular situation gets worse, and then the desirable
economic growth, along with the declined emissions. We argue that the wickedness of pollution cannot
be perceived and dealt with by different stakeholders in the same manner. The perceptions and mindsets
of the stakeholders can be quite different across three main societal sectors. Hence, the attitudes
towards the environmental issues are probably asynchronous, from inactive, to reactive, to active, and
to proactive. The attitudinal combination can lead to various patterns of the pollution-growth curve.
If the attitudinal transitions are taken into account, the curve would assume multi-stage characteristics
and greater diversity. Furthermore, it is our speculation that the inverted U of the EKC could be
a section of the whole curve, so is the N-shaped or the inverted-L or the cubic shaped curve in the
extant EKC empirical study.
3.2. Contributions to Wicked Problems Theory
Our work also has several important implications for research on wicked problems. First, we
extend the work to elaborate on the societal intensity of wickedness, showing how the solutions are
beyond the primary responsibility. Rittel and Webber and followers have depicted wicked problem as
various intractable, interdependent, and socio-economic issues, in particular requiring other manners of
diagnosis and thinking [69]. We argue that pollution problems can take various degrees of wickedness,
requiring discrepant efforts to address: the less wicked may need technical progress and rational
decisions, which can be addressed along with the economic growth, whereas the more wicked need
collaborative actions, proactive leadership and strong organizing of societal actors, which holds no
direct relation with the economic growth.
Second, focusing on the environmental issues, we recognize that social accounts can play important
roles and thus we propose the dynamic process of people’s motivations in addressing more wicked
pollution. Ansari et al. (2013) shows that five mechanisms, including collective theorizing, issue
linkage, active learning, legitimacy seeking, and catalytic amplification, underpin how and why actors
change their frames toward greater consensus around a common logic [68]. Our results are partially
consistent with the findings. We argue that salient events, acting as the catalyst, can promote collective
theorizing, issue linkage, active learning, legitimacy seeking. Meanwhile, we believe that proactive
leadership and strong organizing of societal actors are particularly required in the process. Moreover,
Lazarus (2017) believed that the purpose of environmental strategies is to protect the future at the
expense of the present [30]. Instead, our study argues that the wicked problems can be converted into
new opportunities with proactive attitudes, not necessarily at the expense of the present, for example,
unexpected niches and new fields for social development can arise afterwards. Therefore, wickedness
can be explored and leveraged as a means to drive breakthroughs.
Turning to the case of the construction of ecological demonstration areas in China, where the
effective environmental governance has been made, we agree that a partial or a higher level of concerted
actions can be reached through coercion rather than negotiation due to the more stakeholder power in
the local or national contexts [68]. However, it is important to mention that the keynotes to address
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wicked problems are the formation of a commonly agreed upon design and a good collaboration
mechanism, rather than the prevailing power, though it could be helpful to formulate regulation and
enforce it.
3.3. Methodological Implications
As many of our methodological prescriptions and techniques have been developed for attitude-
and-event-oriented research, one key issue revolves around the measurement and research design of
the research itself. When a research focuses on qualitative descriptions of organizational attitudes,
records, reports, a research design focusing on behavioral observations may be appropriate. When
it is qualitative interpretations and/or reactions to the events of interest, the researcher may better
methodologically consider interviews, observations, and questionnaires. Meanwhile, the advent of
social media (e.g., blogs, Facebook, Twitter) and the increasing ubiquity of audio and video monitoring
of the public places provide many other methodological opportunities. Furthermore, we should
take the prevailing attitude and the attitudinal transition process into account when conducting
societal-oriented research. Many process-oriented scholars offer a range of potential ways to use
qualitative methods to analyze associated issues and their effects on organizational practices and
change [70].
4. Conclusions
Ultimately, the environmental issues are wicked problems at various degrees. The less wicked
pollution—as it is more technical and regional—can be gradually resolved since the economy provides
appropriate technical resources, and law establishment and enforcement, most of which fit perfectly
for the EKC hypothesis. In contrast, the more wicked problems of a greater societal, transboundary,
and transgenerational nature have been most challenging. At best, those problems can only be
resolved and may surface over and over again for the human bounded rationality and societal
uncertainty in due course. If organizations and practitioners tend to address such pollution with
conventional mindsets—optimal or moral—it will come to a wicked mess. Under these circumstances,
the relationships between economic growth and pollution can be more uncertain, and will not be in an
inverted-U shape.
The wicked problem can also be reframed as a wicked opportunity under the condition that all
societal sectors exert their unique functions to take collective actions on the willing, not on the need.
Governments, firms, and civil societies are three important societal sectors defining the pollution, whose
attitudes and behaviors critically determine the pollution growth trajectories. The relationships shall
be very diversified, e.g., a synchronous line, a wave line with the upward tendency, or a wave line with
the downward tendency, given the three societal sectors take different attitudinal portfolios. Among
them, the proactive attitude is necessary to form cooperation and coordination among all stakeholders
to realize both environmental and economic goals. Moreover, the well-structured governance of such
collaboration requires proactive leaders and strong coordination of the societal sectors. Achieving
a proactive attitude is a prerequisite task in addressing such pollution. There are four routes of
attitudinal transition driven by the salient events, and the collaborative route of attitudinal transition
can be achieved to establish a set of strategic dialogues and cooperation among stakeholders.
Integrating and synthesizing the theories and empirical findings of the extant EKC literature, this
paper proposes a conceptual base framework and theoretically demonstrates that different patterns
of pollution emission can be attributed to the pollution of various wicked degrees, and different
attitudes of societal actors towards the more wicked pollution. This theoretical clarification contributes
to the research of wicked problems in that the problems of wicked degrees lead to different causal
relationships with economic growth that requires different strategies, leadership, and societal efforts
to address. In doing so, we hope to advance the conversation on EKC studies and the abatement
practice adaption.
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However, for empirically pursuing a wicked-oriented program of research, a range of
methodological tools and data analysis issues should be taken into consideration. Furthermore,
as to the catalyzers in attitudinal transitions, some triggering events may arise without deliberate
planning, and others can be created strategically to achieve the desired effects. Thus, exploring research
in this avenue can be of great value to policy programming. In addition, contemporary partnership
practices have been criticized for not adequately addressing systematical changes. In this regard, how
to address the “collaborative complexity” is an important avenue for future research.
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